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Abstract—One of the key challenges to the IoT’s success is
how to secure and anonymize billions of IoT transactions and
devices per day, an issue that still lingers despite significant
research efforts over the last few years. On the other hand,
technologies based on blockchain algorithms are disrupting to-
day’s cryptocurrency markets and showing tremendous potential,
since they provide a distributed transaction ledger that cannot
be tampered with or controlled by a single entity. Although the
blockchain may present itself as a cure-all for the IoT’s security
and privacy challenges, significant research efforts still need
to be put forth to adapt the computation-intensive blockchain
algorithms to the stringent energy and processing constraints
of today’s IoT devices. In this paper, we provide an overview of
existing literature on the topic of blockchain for IoT, and present
a roadmap of research challenges that will need to be addressed
to enable the usage of blockchain technologies in the IoT.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Research, Challenges,
Blockchain, Security, Anonymity, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
It is hard to mention a technology that will impact and
benefit our lives more than the Internet of Things (IoT). In a
few years, cars, kitchen appliances, televisions, smartphones,
utility meters, intra-body sensors, thermostats, and almost
anything we can imagine will be absorbed into the Internet
and accessible from anywhere on the planet [1]. The revolution
brought by the IoT will be unmatched – some say it will be
similar to the building of roads and railroads which powered
the Industrial Revolution of the 18th to 19th centuries [2]
– and will take by storm every human sector and industry,
ranging from education, health-care, smart home and smart
city, to manufacturing, mining, commerce, transportation, and
surveillance, just to mention a few [3].
Over the last few years, researchers have mainly focused
their attention on addressing IoT’s computation and com-
munication scalability issues [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. While these
topics are certainly paramount to IoT’s success and need to
be thoroughly investigated, the community has now widely
acknowledged that they have to be considered “low-hanging
fruits” with respect to the towering issues of IoT security
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and privacy, which are unprecedented in scope and magnitude
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and will require considerable
research effort to be overcome. It is easy to imagine, indeed,
that once humans, sensors, cars, robots, and drones are able
to seamlessly interact with each other from any side of the
globe, a number of threats that we cannot even imagine today
will be unveiled.
As currently envisioned, the IoT will implement a central-
ized, client-server based access model in which IoT trans-
actions (i.e., data, money, or any other object of value)
between IoT entities (i.e., any computing device or stakeholder
connected to the IoT) is entrusted to monolithic, centralized
service providers [18]. This model clearly simplifies the inter-
actions between IoT entities and facilitates the data collection
process. However, it ultimately makes the IoT vulnerable to a
number of spinous security and privacy issues. Specifically,
centralized service providers can make illegitimate use of
IoT data, for example, mass-surveillance programs [19]. Even
more importantly, centralized data collection models can ex-
pose the system to hacking by malicious activities, with nefar-
ious consequences for citizens, as unveiled in [20, 21, 22, 23].
Another major challenge is the authentication of IoT entities
that will be mostly deployed in the wild with little supervision
[24, 25]. If not addressed, IoT authentication issues can
generate botnets (e.g., Mirai [26]) and hard-to-tackle sybil
attacks [27]. The key intuition to address the challenges above
is to orchestrate IoT transactions in a decentralized fashion,
so that no single entity has control over them. Not only will
decentralization provide security and privacy by design, but
also empower users with the choice of sharing or selling their
sensor data with third party entities without intermediaries.
Decentralized control also implies scalability – which has
plagued the IoT from its very inception [28, 29]. The end goal,
therefore, is to investigate decentralized data access models
for the IoT, which will ensure that user-data is not entrusted
to centralized entities or companies, but instead is made the
property of the users themselves. To this end, technologies
and systems based on the concept of blockchain have en-
abled the cryptocurrency market, and may prove crucial to
achieve the stringent security and privacy goals of the IoT
[30]. Although the key algorithms and principles behind the
blockchain have been known since the 70’s (i.e., Merkle trees
[31], consensus algorithms [32]), the first practical application
of the blockchain was originally proposed in 2008 as part
of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [33]. Since then, it has been
widely applied to a wide range of non-monetary applications,
including transportation, energy management, smart cities,
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drones/robots, and manufacturing; we survey existing literature
on the topic in Section III.
In a nutshell, a blockchain maintains a collection (or ledger)
of transactions in a decentralized fashion – we describe in
details what a blockchain is in Section II. The ledger is
immutable, meaning that past transactions cannot be modified
by any entity registering transactions in the blockchain1, and
is shared and synchronized across all participating nodes.
This way, the blockchain guarantees that the ledger cannot
be tampered with, and that all the data held by the blockchain
is trustworthy. A consensus algorithm, which involves solving
a hard-to-solve (i.e., resource-demanding) yet easy-to-verify
puzzle called proof-of-work (PoW), is used for appending
(mining) new blocks into the blockchain, and thus establish
a secure trusted network among untrusted entities. For iden-
tification purposes, blockchain nodes may choose to employ
changeable public keys to prevent tracking. Multiple transac-
tions are merged together to form a block which is appended
to the ledger by following the consensus algorithm. Each block
includes the hash of the previous block in the ledger (hence
the name blockchain). Any modifications to a block (and thus
transactions) can be readily detected as the hash maintained
in the subsequent block will not match.
The combination of blockchain and IoT has disruptive
potential. Indeed, the blockchain may help the IoT’s expansion
into our society by providing the following key advantages:
• Anonymity. IoT entities can participate to the blockchain
with a public/private key, which (if so desired) does not
reveal in itself the real identity of the entity;
• Decentralization. Traditional centralized systems require
each transaction be validated through a centralized au-
thority (e.g., a central bank) – which inevitably translates
into a performance bottleneck. Conversely, third-party
validation is no longer needed in the blockchain, since
consensus algorithms maintain data consistency;
• Non-repudiation. The blockchain ensures that (i) transac-
tions can be easily validated; and (ii) invalid transactions
are not admitted – it is nearly impossible to delete or roll
back transactions once included in the blockchain.
Although the blockchain may look as a panacea to the
IoT’s security and privacy issues, there are still many research
challenges that prevent its off-the-shelf application to most
of today’s IoT networks. Indeed, most of the algorithms
used by today’s blockchain-based systems were not designed
to be run on devices with extremely stringent computa-
tion/energy/bandwidth constraints as in the IoT. Several key
challenges (discussed in detail in Section V) need to be
addressed, including: (i) scalability issues that stem from
the need to achieve consensus among potentially billions of
miners; (ii) high computation demands due to the use of
proof-of-work (or similar) algorithms; and (iii) high delays
due to anti-double spending mechanisms (issue which may
not necessarily apply to the IoT).
1Many works refer to the blockchain as an immutable data structure,
however it is technically imprecise to define it as immutable. In fact, there are
precedents where entries in the blockchain have been changed after attacks or
misbehavior of the network [34]. In this paper, the word immutable is intended
to be used to represent the hard-to-change structure of the blockchain [35].
The focus of this paper is to provide an overview of the
state of the art pertaining to the application of blockchain-
based system to address IoT’s security and privacy issues, and
offer a roadmap of novel and exciting research challenges to
the research community. We point out that an in-depth survey
and comparison of existing blockchain-based IoT systems is
not the ultimate objective of this paper. Instead, our main goal
is to prime the readers and stimulate their research efforts
toward the development of next-generation secure-by-design
blockchain-based IoT systems.
II. WHAT IS A BLOCKCHAIN?
From a computational viewpoint, a blockchain is a data
structure where entries (also called blocks) are stored and
linked to one another in sequential order. As shown in Fig.
1, the concept of blockchain is very similar to that of a linked
list, where each entry is linked to the next one by means of
a pointer. Although the two structures above are conceptually
the same, their implementation differs in several major aspects.
Figure 1. The structure of a blockchain.
Each block is composed by a header and a data payload.
While the payload is generally used to store a list of trans-
actions among users of the blockchain, the header is used
to convey useful information with respect to the block, such
as its length and content. Furthermore, the header stores the
32-bit SHA256 [36] hash value of the previous block. The
importance of such a field is twofold: this way, (i) each block
is immutably linked to the previous one; and (ii) the hash
value of the i-th block will depend on the hash value of block
i − 1. The first feature provides a very efficient mechanism
to interconnect all blocks of the blockchain, while the second
one, as discussed later, is used to prevent malicious attacks.
To understand this latter statement, it is important to first
understand how the blockchain is generated and maintained
over time.
A. Consensus Mechanisms
The purpose of the blockchain [33] is to enable peer-to-peer
transactions that are validated, organized into blocks, and then
stored inside a distributed ledger. To achieve this objective, the
blockchain is regulated by decentralized consensus algorithms
that determine how and when a group of transactions can be
included in the ledger. Specifically, each new block can be
appended to the blockchain only if the majority of nodes in the
network agrees upon its inclusions, that is, only if consensus
among users of the blockchain is reached. Each node in the
network keeps a local copy of the blockchain. When a new
block achieves a consensus, it is broadcast over the network.
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Thus, each node appends the new block to its local copy of
the blockchain. These mechanisms make it possible to create
multiple consistent copies of the blockchain, such that as
soon as the majority of nodes possesses the same copy of
the blockchain, the network can be considered as reliable and
trusted.
Consensus is an extremely important concept for the
blockchain. The first implementations of the blockchain
adopted the proof-of-work (PoW) consensus mechanism [37],
which provides a distributed mechanism to maintain and
validate the blockchain. The idea behind PoW is to achieve
consensus among nodes of the network through hard-to-
compute, but easy-to-verify, computational puzzles. For exam-
ple, the Bitcoin blockchain asks its users (also called miners)
to find a 4-byte random number, i.e., the nonce, such that
the SHA256 hash value of a new block is equal to or less
than a given threshold. While the computation of the nonce is
hard and computational-hungry, verifying that a nonce satisfies
the threshold requirement is computationally very inexpensive.
Accordingly, the first node that finds a candidate nonce notifies
the blockchain network and broadcasts the new block. The
obtained nonce, which represents the PoW of the miner, is
tested by other nodes that determine whether or not the nonce
is an actual solution of the hashing puzzle. When the validation
of the nonce is successful, nodes add the new block to their
locally stored blockchain and start working on a new block.
B. Computational Aspects
Although PoW is a very effective mechanism to achieve
consensus, it requires overwhelming amounts of energy and
computational power, which increase every year as more and
more miners and transactions add up to the blockchain [38].
For this reason, other consensus mechanisms [39] have been
considered in many blockchain architectures. As an example,
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanisms [40, 41] use deterministic
rules based on the amount of coins, i.e., the stake, to select
which node in the network will append the next block to the
blockchain. Similarly, the proof-of-importance (PoI) considers
the stake as an important metric as well – however, it accounts
also for metrics that measure the miner’s involvement in the
network, such as number and volume of transactions.
As shown in Fig. 1, the hash value of each block depends
on the hash value of the previous blocks. Thus, a change in
any of the already existing blocks of the blockchain would
produce a different hash value for that block, that will then
generate a cascading effect on all subsequent blocks and their
hash values. The newly generated hash values will be different
from those already stored by all other nodes in the network,
and thanks to the consensus algorithm, the corrupted blocks
will be rejected from the blockchain.
C. Security Aspects
In general, consensus algorithms guarantee the trustworthi-
ness of a blockchain. However, there are cases where mali-
cious users can leverage the blockchain structure to change,
duplicate or delete blocks [42]. Specifically, it is sufficient
for an attacker to possess more than the 50% of the nodes
in the network to take control of the whole blockchain. This
attack, also referred to as the 51% attack, aims at governing
the consensus mechanism to manipulate a blockchain. These
attacks have been shown to be effective against many minor
crypto-currencies such as Verge, Bitcoin Gold and Zencash
[43] – however, they have as well threatened even widespread
crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin [44, 45]. Double-spending
[46, 47], which consists in the replication of one or more
transactions, is the main purpose of 51% attacks. However, it
has been shown that double-spending can be achieved even
without approaching the 50% threshold [48].
To mitigate 51% attacks, ever more blockchain-based sys-
tems are adopting better security strategies. For example, real-
time validators can be used to increase the attack threshold to
99% [49], which means that an attacker can take control over
the blockchain network only if it has access to almost all nodes
in the network. Another approach is to use PoS consensus
mechanisms where the importance given to the possession of
coins (rather than of computational power) makes the 51%
attack unprofitable for the attacker and less likely to happen.
III. OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED IOT SYSTEMS
In this section, we provide a survey of the most relevant
blockchain-based IoT systems investigated so far in literature.
We divide the papers by categories, each named after the most
common IoT applications nowadays available, i.e., smart en-
ergy, smart environments, robotics, transportation, and supply
chain.
• Smart Energy. This field has attracted significant atten-
tion from the IoT community over the last years [50].
The majority of the proposed IoT systems leverage the
blockchain to (i) preserve the privacy of the users along
with their personal information; and (ii) protect the sys-
tem from malicious transaction such as users attempting
to sell or buy unreasonable amount of energy [51, 52, 53].
The authors in [54, 55] propose auction systems where
users can sell to the highest bidder their excessive en-
ergy based on an auction defined in a smart contract,
hence eliminating the need for a third-party auctioneer.
Moreover, Hahn et al. [54] implemented the auction on
a campus-level energy grid. Yan et al. [56] explored the
use of blockchain to reconstruct the current distributed
energy transaction patterns to allow decentralized real-
time transactions and intelligent energy trading contracts
using an automatic trust mechanism.
• Smart Environments. Smart environments have been ex-
tensively in industrial settings [57], for smart healthcare
[58], smart cities [59] and smart homes [60, 61, 62].
In this context, the blockchain is used to ensure the
availability and unrepudiability of sensed data collected
in the wild, e.g., a farm area [63, 64].
• Robotics. Existing work in this area leverages the
blockchain as a system to support secure and reliable
unmanned air vehicles (UAV) communications. Indeed,
UAVs need to reliably coordinate their actions, exchange
data and collaboratively make decisions. Sharma et al.
[65] present a system where drones are programmed
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to use the blockchain to securely relay information.
Moreover, Ferrer et al. [66] investigate the use of the
blockchain to provide security, autonomy and collective
decision-making in swarm robotic systems. The authors
in [67] leverage a combination of blockchain and cloud
storage to protect the integrity of drone-collected data.
• Transportation. Over the last years, many IoT concepts
have been used to design next-generation transportation
systems [68, 69, 70]. The most promising aspect is that
smart vehicles will likely not be as computationally con-
strained as other IoT devices, such as sensor platforms.
Therefore, the blockchain is a strong candidate to become
a system for tamper-proof data exchange among smart ve-
hicles, as proposed by Steger et al. [71]. Similarly, Ceba
et al. [72] monitor vehicle-related data (e.g., maintenance
information and vehicle diagnosis reports) by using the
blockchain. Yuan et al. [73] use the blockchain to design a
full-fledged intelligent transportation system architecture,
which includes application, contract, incentive, consen-
sus, data, physical, and network layers. The blockchain
has also been leveraged to implement systems to handle
the public keys of the vehicles [74], and in general share
data without third-party centralized management [75, 76].
Li et al. [77] propose CreditCoin, a privacy-preserving
system to share relevant information (e.g., accident, traf-
fic) between vehicles, where participants are rewarded
through monetary tokens. Yang et al. [78] proposed a
blockchain-based reputation system that estimates the
trustworthiness of received messages.
• Supply Chain & Others. Some systems have been pro-
posed to enhance the functionality of cloud-based and
on-demand manufacturing [79, 80]. A blockchain-based
distribution framework to share knowledge and services
across enterprises is presented in [81]. A set of papers
[82, 83, 84, 85, 86] address edge computing, virtualiza-
tion of IoT resources, among others.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE IOT
In this section, we discuss the most important blockchain
technologies and features, and we discuss their application to
the IoT.
A. Smart Contracts
One of the key challenges of the IoT is to enable and control
autonomous and self-organized machine-to-machine (M2M)
communications. In this specific context, it is of paramount
importance to design management mechanisms such that (i)
interactions are automatically initiated; and (ii) there is no need
to individually control and verify the trustworthiness of each
interaction/communication. The above problem is definitely
not trivial, and its complexity is further exacerbated by the
large number of connected devices and their heterogeneous
design. It is worth mentioning that the above problem is not
peculiar of the IoT only, but it also affects all of those network
architectures and systems where the lack of centralized entities
that perform centralized network control and management call
for self-organized and automated protocols.
The best example is the blockchain, a system where dis-
tributed entities are required to autonomously reach consensus
by locally executing complex algorithms. In this context, smart
contracts [87] has been shown to be effective to solve the
above challenges.
In a nutshell, smart contracts are software programs that
specify and automatically enforce contracts among two or
more parties. To understand how smart contracts work, we
consider the case where Alice rents a house to Bob. Bob is
required to send a monthly payment to Alice. In the context
of the blockchain, the above transaction can be easily encoded
into a smart contract. As an example, in Ethereum’s blockchain
each smart contract is represented by a series of computational
operations that are expressed via a programming language that
is specified by an Application Binary Interface (ABI). Indeed,
it is sufficient to write a few lines of code to generate and
link the contract to Bob, such that the monthly payment can
be automatically triggered by a software program when the
monthly deadline is over. Therefore, smart contracts imple-
ment effective mechanisms to send/receive payments (i.e., the
rent) to/from other entities when one or more conditions (i.e.,
monthly deadline) are satisfied.
Although the previous example is very simple, contracts can
generally implement very complex operations and can also be
linked one to another, thus generating a nested structure (e.g.,
sublease). The advantages of smart contracts are numerous,
and their impact on IoT networks is considerable, as discussed
in [87]. First, since contracts are stored inside the blockchain,
their content is trusted among parties as it cannot be modified
or corrupted after its inclusion in the blockchain. Second, each
contract is assigned an unequivocal address in the blockchain
and can be directly accessed from the Internet, thus making
smart contracts well-suited to be accessed by remotely con-
nected IoT devices. Finally, contracts consist of few lines of
code that devices can easily understand and execute.
Given the similarities between the IoT and the blockchain,
and looking at the success and effectiveness of smart contracts
in blockchain applications, it is reasonable to assume that
smart contracts can find useful applications in the IoT to
support autonomous and self-organized interactions. Although
the application of smart contracts to the IoT is still being
investigated, preliminary results already show that several IoT
applications would benefit from blockchain technologies such
as smart contracts. For example, the application of smart
contracts to devise access control mechanisms that regulate
the access to the IoT network has been shown to be beneficial
for the IoT [88, 89, 90, 91, 92]. These works leverage the
immutability of the blockchain to generate real-time access
control lists that also regulate and describe access policies to
device resources. Another example is the work in [87], where
authors discuss the possibility to achieve smart supply chain
monitoring by means of smart contracts. They show that, not
only smart contracts can be used to regulate transactions and
fees related to the production and shipment processes of goods,
but they can also be used to keep track of their position.
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B. Software and Content Validation
The IoT system is well-known to be a heterogeneous
environment where substantially different devices (in terms
of hardware and offered services) interact with both users
and other devices. In this challenging scenario, it is crucial
to guarantee that the software embedded in each device (e.g.,
firmware, scripts) is always up-to-date and satisfies regulations
and security requirements of the network. Although the sheer
number of devices in the network complicates the design
of mechanisms that meet the above requirements in large-
scale heterogeneous networks, the blockchain already provides
useful embedded features that completely, or partially, address
the above issues.
As shown in [83, 93], the distributed nature of the
blockchain may be leveraged to store and disseminate secure
and verified firmware updates over the network. Specifically,
the blockchain can be used to (i) store either the firmware
update itself, or the address of a safe and trusted location
where the updated code can be downloaded and installed; and
(ii) use PoW (or similar tools) to determine when a device
possesses an updated and verified firmware, thus deciding
whether or not a device can be trusted. Since the blockchain
is maintained through consensus mechanisms, it is possible to
generate trusted blockchains that store all trusted and up-to-
date firmware updates [83] that can be easily identified and
downloaded by network nodes.
Another interesting application of blockchain technologies
to IoT systems is the possibility to provide reliable license
validation tools to avoid piracy and preserve copyrights of
software/hardware developers [94] and content creators [95].
Indeed, IoT devices are nowadays capable of performing
heterogeneous sensing and computational tasks, and can be
reprogrammed by dynamically loading different software ap-
plications coming from different developers. Although open-
source software is now widely used in many IoT environ-
ments, there are still several applications whose code can be
purchased from the Internet through licensing. The purpose of
[94] is to leverage blockchain technologies to provide effective
licensing validation tools for a software developer to enforce
their copyright.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD
We now propose a roadmap of research challenges pertain-
ing to the application of blockchain algorithms to the IoT.
A. Addressing Blockchain Scalability Issues
Applying blockchain technologies to the IoT implies that
scalability issues must be addressed. Most importantly, exist-
ing blockchain tools require all nodes in the network to either
approve each transaction/block, or store them locally. While
these tasks are easy for personal computers or workstations,
they may be prohibitive for small sensors with limited storage
and computational resources. This issue is further exacerbated
by the fact that the amount of data transmissions, and thus
required transactions, to be stored in the blockchain is large
and exponentially increasing over time [30, 96, 97, 98].
In other words, existing consensus algorithms that rely on
Figure 2. DAG blockchain (or Tangle).
Figure 3. Traditional linear blockchain
PoW and PoS are not directly applicable to address long-
term, reliable and scalable solutions for blockchain-based IoT
systems.
The most widely used approach to address scalability issues
is to leverage clustering algorithms to reduce communication
and computation overheads [61, 90]. For example, Novo [90]
proposes a scalable blockchain solution for IoT systems. At the
cost of additional communication delay, the proposed solution
relies on a management hub that handles a group of IoT
devices, thus reducing the number of interactions between
things and the blockchain, effectively producing a scalable
blockchain design. A similar approach is instead proposed by
Dorri et al. [61], where the authors design a scalable secure
and privacy-preserving blockchain for IoT applications.
Other approaches choose to revisit the structure of consen-
sus mechanisms and the blockchain itself to provide ad-hoc so-
lutions for the IoT. Glaring examples are the crypto-currencies
IoT Chain (ITC) [99] and IOTA [100]. These currencies are
built to provide lightweight blockchain technologies for the
IoT. Specifically, together with other coins such as Byteball
[101], ITC and IOTA aim at reshaping the linear structure of
the blockchain to obtain a tangled [100] network represented
by a direct acyclic graph (DAG). The differences between
traditional (linear) blockchain approaches and the DAG-based
one are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. In the DAG-based architecture
(also called tangle), blocks represents vertices of the DAG
and edges are used to validate transactions. Specifically, to be
included in the DAG, each new transaction A must approve
any two transactions B and C already included in the DAG.
Approval of transactions is represented through directed edges
going from a transaction to another. Accordingly, when A is
included in the DAG, it automatically generates two edges
A→ B and A→ C that extend the DAG incrementally. The
synergic usage of DAGs and blockchain technologies allows
to dispose of the linear structure of traditional blockchains,
facilitate transaction verification times and eliminate the need
for mining as transactions are in charge of validating other
transactions.
B. IoT-tailored Security and Reliability
Being able to remotely access one or more devices, together
with the possibility to let them communicate and coordinate
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with each other autonomously is with no doubt a very useful
and remarkable feature. However, this inevitably poses several
concerns from the security and reliability viewpoints [10, 47].
The IoT is vulnerable to a wide variety of network attacks
that undermine the confidentiality, integrity, authentication and
availability. These aspects are fundamental requirements of
any modern communication network and a variety of solutions
for have been proposed in the literature [10, 14, 47, 102, 103].
These surveys provide an exhaustive literature review of
already existing solutions to design secure and reliable IoT
systems. At the same, however, they show that many security
solutions are not general enough and require ad-hoc solutions
that involves new algorithms and software.
The blockchain already implements several mechanisms
such as public/private encryption, hashing, consensus and
fault-tolerance whose effectiveness in terms of security has
been widely investigated and verified for many networking
scenarios. For this reason, the blockchain has been identified as
a pivotal technology to design secure and reliable IoT systems
[61, 104, 105, 106].
• Confidentiality: data confidentiality is achieved when a
given information (e.g., sensing data, transaction) can
be accessed by intended devices only. In this context,
public key encryption used to perform transactions in the
blockchain can be seamlessly used to encrypt communi-
cations and data to be stored, thus effectively achieving
confidentiality;
• Integrity: to guarantee that data accessed and stored by
IoT devices is reliable, integrity of contents must be
ensured at all times. Again, the blockchain comes in help
by providing useful mechanisms to guarantee integrity
of data. Recall that the integrity of each block in the
blockchain is verified by computing its hash value, and
that the hash value of any block depends on the hash
of previous blocks. Accordingly, not only hashing in
the blockchain ensures integrity of a new block, but it
also extends the integrity check to all previous blocks.
As shown in [104], the same concept can be used in
blockchain-based IoT networks to check the integrity of
sensing data, transmitted data and transactions among
devices and users;
• Authentication and Non-repudiation: by leveraging on the
already embedded public key encryption it is possible to
implement signature-based security mechanisms, which
are well-known to jointly provide authentication and non-
repudiation [107]. Recall that any node B possessing the
public key of a given device A can i) decode messages
encrypted by using A’s private key; and ii) encrypt
messages with the public key of A. Since the private key
of A is known to A only, public key encryption makes
it possible to use private keys to generate an electronic
signature of A. This signature is used to authenticate
A when it communicates with other nodes (each node
can verify the signature by using A’s public key); and
can be used for non-repudiation purposes to sign all the
transactions included in the blockchain that involve A,
thus effectively proving A’s activity on the blockchain.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided an overview of existing
literature on the topic of blockchain for IoT, and presented a
roadmap of research challenges that will need to be addressed
to enable the usage of blockchain technologies in the IoT.
First, we have briefly introduced the concept of blockchain
in Section II, followed by an overview of existing blockchain-
based IoT applications in Section III. Then, we have presented
the major blockchain technologies for the IoT in Section IV.
We have concluded the paper by discussing several research
challenges in Section V.
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